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Abstract
How does the probability of being involved in a renegotiation during the execution of
a procurement contract affect the behavior of the interested contractors? What are its
implications for the optimal contractual choice made by the buyer? We investigate these
issues in a context characterized by uncertainty about the adequateness of the project initially
specified by the buyer. We determine under which circumstances the buyer may find it
profitable to hold an auction for a project design which ex-ante does not have the highest
probability of being adequate.
Keywords: Asymmetric Auctions, Procurement, Renegotiation.
JEL classifications: D44, D86, H57.
1 Introduction
Contracts concerning the provision of customized goods or services are often granted through
auctions. Auctions are widely advocated since they guarantee transparency and foster competi-
tion, allowing the buyer to obtain the desired good at the most favorable economic conditions.
However, once awarded, a number of procurement contracts require modifications which may
significantly change the design of the good. In a lot of cases the events which trigger the revision
of the original agreement could have been anticipated at the time at which the initial contract
was drawn up.1
If a renegotiation significantly alters the scale and the scope of the original contract, one may
question the optimality of the auction outcome. A firm suitable to provide the original service
may no longer be the most appropriate operator when the contract is altered. Nevertheless,
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comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Micael Castanheira, Antonio Estache, Elisabetta Iossa, Georg
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1In this regard, Guasch (2004) provides extensive empirical evidence of strategic renegotiation of concession
contracts granted in Latin America and the Caribbean in the period 1985-2000.
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contract clauses may prevent the buyer from turning to another firm for the provision of the
service or may just make it unprofitable.
A compelling example involves the construction of the new railway station in Mons (Bel-
gium). At the time of the call for tenders in 2006, the stated objective of the local authorities
was to preserve the original station which dated back to the 1950s. The renowned Spanish
architect Santiago Calatrava was granted the contract since his design was the only one which
met that requirement. Because of technical problems, the initial winning design could not be
undertaken and Calatrava’ s architectural firm worked out a new project which would lead to
the replacement of the old station. Presumed similarities existing with other project designs
rejected at the bidding stage have sparked a lot of criticism: indeed, rival and lesser-known
architectural firms have claimed that they could deliver the same project at a lower price.2
This example raises the question of whether a buyer would find it advantageous to choose
a design which has a high ex-ante probability of being infeasible. Similarly, we may wonder
whether the buyer would select a contractor who is not the most appropriate for the project
design ultimately implemented. In this paper, we provide an answer to these questions showing
the existence of a non-trivial trade-off between the cost of an ill-specification of the project
design and the benefits of intensifying competition ex-ante.
We show that a buyer may decide to hold an auction for a project specification which is
highly likely to be inappropriate (that is, a wrong project) to stiffen competition at the bidding
stage when the potential contractors have different design specializations.3
Bidders know that with some positive probability the initial design will be flawed and ra-
tionally incorporate the rents they expect to earn at the renegotiation stage when they submit
their bids. If renegotiation is always successful and the bidders have the same bargaining power,
the expected rents enter the firms’ bidding functions in the same way and, as a result, the initial
choice of the design is neutral as it affects neither the efficiency of the contract allocation nor the
expected buyer’s payoff. However, the renegotiation rents may not be high enough to compen-
sate some contractors for the higher cost of production that an alternative project design entails.
If so, renegotiation fails with some positive probability and, then, there is scope for a strategic
choice of the initial design. In this case, the expectation that the starting design of the project
may fail causes an asymmetric shift in the bidding functions of the firms. The buyer can thus
take advantage of the firms’ heterogeneous reactions to countervail the existing cost asymmetry
among bidders and receive lower and more aggressive bids. The buyer may optimally choose the
wrong specification to intensify competition at the bidding stage even at the expense of going
through a costly renegotiation with a higher probability.4
In the model we assume that a buyer wishes to procure a good and holds an auction to select
the contractor. There are two alternative specifications of the good, A and B, and the prior
probability that either design turns out to be flawed, if implemented, is common knowledge to
2LeVif.be: ”La gare Calatrava a` Mons: un projet conteste´ et suspect” - April 20, 2010.
3There are many reasons why firms may incur different costs to deliver alternative designs. For instance, they
may be heterogeneous for reasons related to their size or to the skills of their human resources.
4The assumption of incomplete information plays a critical role. If the buyer knew the firms’ cost of production
there would be no need to stiffen competition in the auction.
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all the players of the game. We assume that there are two bidders, a and b, who are specialized
in delivering one specification of the project each. The alternative designs of the project require
different capabilities from the engaged contractor and therefore entail different production costs.
In particular, we assume that the relative cost advantage enjoyed by one bidder in undertaking
project A is reversed when it is the alternative project specification B to be carried out.
Throughout the model we rely extensively on the results of the literature on asymmetric
auctions. In the independent private value model, Maskin and Riley (2000b) and Lebrun (1996)
prove the existence of an equilibrium, while Maskin and Riley (2003) and Lebrun (1999) show
under what conditions the equilibrium is unique. In particular, we draw heavily on the insights
provided by Maskin and Riley (2000a) on the bidding behavior of asymmetric bidders in a first-
price auction. They show that a weak bidder, namely a bidder who is more likely to have a low
valuation for the good, submits more aggressive bids than a strong bidder. Stated differently,
this means that the degree of bid-shading of the weak bidder is lower than than of the strong
bidder. In a similar vein, Lebrun (1998) shows that if the valuation distribution of one bidder
stochastically increases, so does his own bid distribution while his rivals will submit higher bids
in equilibrium.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to highlight how the buyer can strategically use
the design of the good she needs to procure to toughen price competition at the tender stage.
In a related vein, Eso¨ and White (2004) consider a setting in which there may be pure risk in
the bidders’ valuations, arising from information that none of the bidders can obtain before the
tender takes place. They find that bidders who have decreasing absolute risk aversion are better
off when the object sold by the auctioneer is riskier as they will submit less aggressive bids. In
contrast, we show that the auctioneer may prefer to auction off a design whose probability of
being inadequate is higher so as to stiffen competition at the bidding stage between risk-neutral
bidders.
Our paper is also close to Waehrer (1999) who considers a buyer who uses an auction for the
purchase of a primary good and may subsequently decide to purchase from the same winning
bidder a supplementary good whose price is determined through sequential bargaining. The
author shows that the bidders will not follow a separating bidding strategy, namely one which
is strictly monotone in their cost of production for the primary good, if this would allow the
buyer to learn their cost of production for the supplementary good.5 We deal with a related
problem since we consider a buyer who may want to change the design of the good after awarding
the contract to a supplier through an auction. The buyer may use the winning bid to update
her belief about the contractor’s costs of production and this impacts on the bidders’ bidding
strategies. To make the model tractable and ensure that the bidders follow a separating bidding
strategy in equilibrium, we assume that the winning bidder holds all the bargaining power at the
ex-post bargaining stage. Different modeling approaches are pursued by Elyakime et al. (1997)
and Estache and Quesada (2002) to guarantee tractability and ensure bidding strategies which
are monotonic in the bidders’ private information. Elyakime et al. (1997) study a first-price
auction in which the auctioneer’s reservation price is not announced in advance and bargaining
5This is an illustration of the ratchet effect first formalized by Laffont and Tirole (1988).
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occurs between the auctioneer and the bidder with the highest bid if the auction fails to produce
a transaction. They assume that bargaining occurs under complete information and the parties
split evenly the surplus when there are gains from trade. The features of the bargaining stage are
anticipated by the bidders at the tender stage. In contrast, Estache and Quesada (2002) assume
that the auctioneer and the bidders overlook the possibility of renegotiation when designing the
auction and deciding the bids, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses
the features of the renegotiation game. Section 3 analyzes the case in which the buyer holds a
first-price auction to award the contract and the contractor is entitled to make a take-it-or-leave-
it (TIOLI) offer at the renegotiation stage. Section 4 shows that the main conclusions regarding
the strategic choice of the initial design of the project in a first-price auction environment carry
over to an English auction format. Section 5 provides a brief discussion of some of the most
relevant assumptions of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a risk-neutral female buyer such as a public agency who wishes to procure a good from
the outside. The buyer must choose between two alternative designs of the good that we call A
and B. The buyer attaches a positive value v > 0 to the good. If the initial design turns out to
be flawed, then the project yields the buyer utility v − h ∈ [0, v] if it is not modified. Whereas,
if a design change occurs and the alternative specification is adopted, the buyer again attains
utility v. Every player knows that the ex-ante probability that A (respectively, B) is the correct
design is 1− β (β).
There are two risk-neutral male bidders, a and b, who have different project design special-
izations. In particular, we assume that bidder a bears a low cost of production to deliver design
A, caA, and bears a high cost to deliver design B, caB. By contrast, bidder b incurs a high cost
to produce A, cbA and a low cost to produce B, cbB.
Bidders’ low production costs, caA and cbB, are realizations of a random variable c˜l, which is
distributed according to distribution Fl over the interval [cl, cl]. Bidders’ high production costs,
caB and cbA, are realizations of a random variable c˜h distributed according to distribution Fh over
the interval [ch, ch]. All realizations are independent and it holds that cl < cl ≤ ch < ch < v.
Each bidder is privately informed about his own costs of production for the two alternative
designs. In contrast, the costs’ distributions and the buyer’s utility function are publicly known.
We further denote by c˜ the random variable c˜h − c˜l, whose distribution and density are F (c˜)
and f(c˜), respectively.6
In practice, one may think of a large and a small firm. The former has higher fixed costs
but can take advantage of economies of scale, whereas the latter has higher variable costs, but
negligible fixed costs. If A and B differ with respect to the size of the project, it is reasonable to
suppose that the large firm will bear a lower total cost of production than the small firm when
the larger design is undertaken and vice versa.
6f(c˜) is the convolution of the density functions of c˜h and of c˜l.
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Because of the design specialization, if the buyer holds an auction for project A and this
subsequently turns out to be flawed, then bidder a will be reluctant to shift to project B as it
involves a higher cost of production while bidder b will eagerly accept the design change as it
will allow him to save on the production cost.
Henceforth, we assume that once the tender process has taken place, the buyer is stuck to
the selected contractor and cannot hire the other firm.7 Moreover, we assume that it is not
possible to write a contract contingent on the adoption of a different design ex-post, namely, the
procurement contract must specify the delivery of either A or B. In practice, ex-ante it may be
prohibitively costly to describe both designs in the contract and the buyer must content herself
with initially specifying only A or B.
The contractor is selected through a low-bid auctions whose rules also determine the transfer
paid by the buyer for the delivery of the good. We start by considering a first-price reverse
auction in which the lowest bidder is awarded the contract and receives a transfer t from the
buyer which is equal to his winning bid. If there is more than one lowest bidder, the tie is broken
randomly.
We focus on fixed-price contracts where the awardee does not receive any reimbursement for
the costs he incurs. We make this choice for several reasons. First, the buyer might be unable
to verify the contractor’s realized cost. Second, fixed price contracts are most often awarded
through auctions. In the United States, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs) recommend
the use of auctions of fixed price-contracts for public sector purchases. Finally, Bajari and Tadelis
(2001) have emphasized the merits of a cost-plus contract when it comes to renegotiating an
agreement, and their argument is mainly based on their greater flexibility to adapt to ex-post
adjustments than fixed-price contracts. However, if cost-plus contracts were auctioned off, the
bids would not convey any information about the bidders’ costs of production. 8 In an auction
environment, we aim to investigate how the award of a fixed-price contract affects the buyer’s
utility and behavior in the presence of a known positive probability that the initial agreement
will warrant some changes.
The timing of the game is as follows:
 At time 0, β is observed by all the players of the game. The buyer decides whether to
auction off project A or B.
 At time 1, the low-bid auction takes place and the buyer selects the contractor.
 At time 2, uncertainty is resolved. If the project design chosen at time 0 exhibits im-
perfections, a renegotiation between the buyer and the selected contractor occurs and, if
successful, the design changes.
 At time 3, the project is delivered and payoffs are realized.
7For concreteness, one may think of a large cost of breaching the initial contract which makes it unprofitable
for the buyer to back out. Furthermore, we implicitly assume away the possibility of subcontracting the work to
another firm (e.g., the rival firm may no longer be available).
8For further details, see McAfee and McMillan (1986). Note also that the standard cost-plus contract provided
by The American Institute of Architects, A-102-2007, is not intended for use in auctions.
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Note that we analyze what project design would be selected when there is imperfect in-
formation about the production costs incurred by the firms. In the absence of information
asymmetries, a competition effect could not arise and, as a result, there would not be scope for
a strategic choice of the initial design.
2.1 Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information
The different design specializations of the two bidders clearly impact on their renegotiation
claims, and under some circumstances can even prevent a design change from occurring. In
turn, these considerations undoubtedly affect the bidding strategies pursued by the two firms.
To determine the buyer’s utility function and the bidders’ profit functions, we need to make an
assumption on the way renegotiation takes place.
When the initial specification happens to be flawed, the buyer wishes to change the design
not to incur the net loss of welfare h. The cost parameters of the contractors continue to remain
their private information. This assumption is in line with Bajari and Tadelis (2001), where
modification costs cannot be accurately measured. Since the extent to which the design change
has hurt the cost efficiency of the contractor cannot be verified, any agent’s reimbursement claim
for the increased cost of delivery the good cannot be trusted. However, the contractor is entitled
to reject any revision of the original agreement.
In developing a bargaining model in presence of asymmetric information, one comfortable
option is to focus on the polar case in which the informed party (i.e., the contractor) can make
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to which he can fully commit. This is consistent with the results of the
literature on bargaining under asymmetric information (see Samuelson, 1984) which predicts
that the parties may sometimes fail to reach an agreement and that the first best is attainable
provided that the informed party may commit to the first-and-final offer he makes.
While stark, this assumption on how the bargaining power is allocated ex-post has the
benefit of ensuring tractability. The buyer might be able to update her belief about the cost
structure of the contractor she is facing at the renegotiation stage. If she holds some bargaining
power at stage 2, then the bidders’ equilibrium bidding strategies will not be monotonic in their
private information, as shown by Waehrer (1999). In our setting, the assumption that ex-post
the supplier can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer may be reasonable since we have assumed that,
once the contract is awarded, the buyer is stuck with the contractor and the other supplier is
no longer available..
In what follows, we study how the potential renegotiation game occurring at time 2 impacts
on the firms’ bidding behavior at time 1 and, in turn, on the buyer’s initial choice of the design
at time 0.
3 Renegotiation and Strategic Choice of the Design
A contractor who happens to be involved in a renegotiation with the buyer will make the most
of his perfect information about the buyer’s utility, asking for h, which is publicly observable.
However, in some occurrences the contractor may be still unwilling to accept the design change.
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This event occurs when the contractor has to incur a higher cost of production to deliver the
new project design and the renegotiation rent, h, is not large enough to reimburse him for the
increased cost. Therefore, we must take into account that the renegotiation may break down
when an auction for A (B) has been held, a (b) has been awarded the contract, and the buyer
requests a change in the design. When the buyer auctions off project design A and, once the
uncertainty is resolved, she is willing to adopt the alternative design B, the higher cost of
production firm a has to incur may prevent the renegotiation process. This occurs whenever h
is greater than the difference in a’s cost of production for the two alternative designs.
In what follows, we distinguish between two cases: when the value of the renegotiation rent
is so high that a requested design change always succeeds (i.e., h ≥ ch − cl) and when h is
not so high and, as a result, a requested renegotiation may not lead to a design change (i.e.,
h < ch − cl). Such distinction will be crucial to determine whether or not the buyer may decide
to strategically choose the design to auction off.
First note that when the buyer initially avails herself of project design A, her expected utility
is given by:
EU(A) = v − tw − βh. (1)
This is so irrespective of whether or not there exists some positive probability that renegotiation
breaks down and is due to the buyer’s lack of bargaining power at the renegotiation stage. In
the expression above, t is the transfer from the buyer to the contractor, and the subscript w in
the above equation can be equal to either a or b and denotes the winning bidder.
Whereas, when B is the starting project design, her expected utility is:
EU(B) = v − tw − (1− β)h.
Note that the buyer sets a ceiling to the bids she receives. Specifically, when the design she
auctions off is A, the buyer turns down all the bids above v − βh as they would yield her a
negative expected utility. Likewise, when the initial design is B the maximum acceptable bid is
v − (1− β)h.
3.1 Neutrality of the Initial Design
We first consider the case in which the parties always succeed in renegotiating the contract,
regardless of the identity of the winning bidder, i.e. h ≥ c¯h− cl. This implies that the maximum
cost differential is very small or that the renegotiation loss would be hefty.
We illustrate the profit functions and the bidders’ types when the buyer auctions off project
design A. It is straightforward to restate the expressions when B is the initial project specifi-
cation. Let ciJ be i’s cost of production for design J , with i = a, b and J = A,B. Then, a’s
expected profit function takes the following form:
Epia(A) =
ta − (1− β)caA − β(caB − h) if a wins0 otherwise.
In the above expression, ta denotes a’s bid. Analogously, b’s expected profit function is:
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Epib(A) =
tb − (1− β)cbA − β(cbB − h) if b wins0 otherwise.
In the above expression, tb denotes b’s bid.
A crucial role in the analysis is played by the bidders’ pseudo-types θiJ , for i = a, b and
J = A,B. These consist of two components. The first is the bidder’s expected cost of production
which may depend on the design which is initially auctioned off. We denote this expected cost
by E[ci(J)], with i = a, b and J = A,B. The second is the expected rent which merely shifts to
the left the expected total cost of delivering the good. Note that also the second component of
a bidder’s pseudo-type may be affected by the initial design of the good.
θaA =
E[ca(A)]︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− β)caA + βcaB −βh
θbA = (1− β)cbA + βcbB︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[cb(A)]
−βh
The generic bidder’s pseudo-type, θiJ , is then drawn from a distribution ΦiJ , which we
assume to be twice continuously differentiable with strictly positive density φiJ , on the interval
[θiJ , θiJ ] for i = a, b and J = A,B.
9 Specifically, when the initial design is A, the supports areSupp ΦaA = [(1− β)cl + βch − βh; (1− β)cl + βch − βh] = [θaA; θaA]Supp ΦbA = [(1− β)ch + βcl − βh; (1− β)ch + βcl − βh] = [θbA; θbA]
As a matter of fact, what distinguishes the bidders is only the cost function while the
renegotiation rent they expect to earn is the same. The profit functions we have set out above
are correct as long as h is greater than the actual cost of modifying the design of the project c,
so that the renegotiation between the buyer and the contractor always proves successful.10
Throughout we maintain the following standard assumption:
Assumption 1. (a) Bidders’ cost parameters are drawn independently;
(b) Bidders’ expected profit functions are monotonically decreasing in the firms’ own pseudo-
types;
(c) Bidders’ expected profit functions are weakly supermodular.
Note that the profit functions written above are both monotonically decreasing and weakly
supermodular (the latter condition is always satisfied when bidders are risk neutral). The
following lemma concerns the firms’ bidding behavior:
Lemma 1. If Assumption 1 holds, bidders bid according to a weakly monotonic bidding function.
That is, if ti = γi(θiJ), then γi(θ
′
iJ) ≥ γi(θˆiJ) if θ′iJ > θˆiJ , for i = a, b and J = A,B.
9Note that the distributions of c˜l and c˜h must be such that the above assumptions on the distributions of the
pseudo-types are satisfied.
10In particular, renegotiation succeeds even if the awardee for the initial project designs A and B are firms a
and b, respectively.
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Proof. In the Appendix
We can now proceed with our first result:
Proposition 1. If
(i) the contractor is entitled to make, and can commit to, a take-it-or-leave it offer to the
buyer at the renegotiation stage;
(ii) Assumption 1 holds;
(iii) h ≥ ch − cl,
then:
1. Bidders fully compete away h at the bidding stage.
2. The buyer is indifferent between auctioning off design A or B.
Proof. In the Appendix
The first part of the proposition says that the renegotiation rent does not represent a concern
for the buyer. This is because the renegotiation rent is entirely discounted at the bidding stage.
The reason is the following. Both bidders know the probability with which they will earn a rent
if they are granted the project, and they know the magnitude of the rent itself. The expected
value of renegotiation is the same for the two bidders when h ≥ c¯h−cl. Therefore, a competitive
bidding process will work in a Bertrand fashion, allowing the buyer to extract all the winning
bidder’s willingness to pay to be granted the right to potentially earn the renegotiation rent,
that is, βh for design A and (1− β)h for design B.
The second part of the proposition says that when renegotiation is always successful, it does
not matter to the buyer which project design is auctioned off. Namely, the initial choice of
the design is neutral as it does not affect the players’ payoffs. To see this, consider that when
h ≥ c¯h − cl the expected cost of production of the two bidders is independent of the design
initially auctioned off, that is E[ci(A)] = E[ci(B)] for i = a, b. Therefore the initial design
only impacts on the expected renegotiation rent which is entirely competed away at the bidding
stage.
3.2 Auction of the Wrong Project
Now we turn to the case in which the renegotiation rent may be lower then the increased cost
of production that a design change entails.
Suppose that design A is auctioned off. Relative to the previous section, only bidder a’s
expected profit function may change as she may refuse to change the design if defective. This
happens when h < caB − caA, in which occurrence a’s expected profit function conditional on
winning becomes:
Epia(A) = ta − caA
9
Whereas, if h ≥ caB − caA, the expected profit function of firm a conditional on winning is the
same as the one shown in the previous subsection:
Epia(A) = ta − (1− β)caA − β(caB − h)
On the contrary, bidder b is always willing to shift to design B as this would entail a reduction
in the cost of production.
The buyer anticipates that if a wins the contract to deliver design A and this specification
subsequently fails, event which occurs with probability β, there is some positive probability that
the design change will not be successful. While the difference in the cost of production caB−caA
is a’s private information, the buyer knows that this is distributed according to the distribution
F (·). Thus, from the buyer’s perspective, the ex-ante probability that a will be willing to shift
from A to B is F (h).
Let us now consider how the bidders’ pseudo-types change if the buyer decides to contract
out project specification A or B. In the former case, a’s pseudo-type is:
θaA =
(1− β)caA + β(caB − h) if h ≥ caB − caAcaA if h < caB − caA
while b’s pseudo-type does not change: θbA = (1− β)cbA + β(cbB − h).
When B is auctioned off, it is bidder b who may not want to shift to project design A, should
B turn out to be defective. b’s pseudo-type is:
θbB =
βcbB + (1− β)(cbA − h) if h ≥ cbA − cbBcbB otherwise.
whereas a’s pseudo-type is: θaB = βcaB + (1− β)(caA − h).
Adapting the Maskin and Riley’s framework to a procurement auction, we can define the
weak bidder (w) as the one whose pseudo-type’s distribution first order stochastically dominates
that of the strong bidder (s):11
Φw(θ) < Φs(θ), ∀θ ∈ (θs, θw) (2)
Note that (2) implies that θs ≤ θw and θs ≤ θw.
Since the distributions of bidders’ pseudo-types vary with the values of β and h, the identities
of the strong and weak bidders are endogenously determined by these parameters. Even though
the buyer cannot set either of them, she can decide which project design to auction off at the
beginning of the game (whether A or B). This affects the probability of a renegotiation and, in
turn, the distributions of the bidders’ pseudo-types the buyer faces. In other words, the buyer
can influence the competitiveness of the bidding process with her initial decision of the project
design. Before drawing some conclusions on the buyer’s optimal strategy, we impose a property
which is stronger than first order stochastic dominance, hazard rate dominance. We make the
following assumption:
11Note that we remove the subscript referring to the design auctioned off to save on notation.
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Assumption 2. Φw(θ) stochastically dominates Φs(θ) according to the Hazard Rate, that is:
φw(θ)
1− Φw(θ) <
φs(θ)
1− Φs(θ) , ∀θ ∈ [θw, θs]
Prior to discuss the implications of hazard rate dominance, we need to introduce some more
concepts and notation. The following lemma, established by Maskin and Riley (2000a,b, 2003),
shows that, under our assumptions on the bidders’ preferences, the distribution of winning
bids in equilibrium has a support consisting of a closed interval [t, t¯] and is continuous on that
support. When these conditions are satisfied, the same authors show that a bidder’s equilibrium
bid function is strictly monotonic in his own type. This allows us to work with equilibrium
inverse bid functions that we call gi(t) which are evaluated at t ∈ [t, t¯].
Lemma 2. If Assumption 1 holds, the distribution of winning bids in equilibrium
(a) is an interval [t, t¯];
(b) has a continuous c.d.f. on [t, t¯].
Proof. See Maskin and Riley (2000b), Proposition 3.
Let Pi(t) be the ex-ante equilibrium bid distribution function of bidder i. This is the ex-ante
probability that bidder i submits a bid lower than t. We say that a bidder i bids consistently
more aggressively than bidder j if i shades less his bid above his pseudotype than j for any
θ in the interior of their common support. In terms of equilibrium inverse bid functions, this
implies that gi(t) > gj(t) for t ∈ (t, t) (see Maskin and Riley, 2000a and Kirkegaard, 2009).
The following lemma shows that when Assumptions 1 and 2 are fulfilled, the distribution of
the equilibrium bids of the weak firm will first order stochastically dominate that of the strong
firm. Moreover, the weak bidder will submit consistently more aggressive bids than the strong
bidder.12
Lemma 3. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then
1. Pw(t) < Ps(t) for all t ∈ (t, t);
2. the weak bidder will bid more aggressively than the strong bidder for any bid on the interior
of their common support, that is, ∀t ∈ (t, t), it holds that gw(t) > gs(t).
Proof. In the Appendix.
We now introduce the following definition of wrong project.
Definition 1 (Wrong project). A wrong project is a project design whose prior probability of
being flawed exceeds that of another design specification available to the buyer.
12Two remarks. First, in fact only first-order stochastic dominance of the pseudo-types’ distribution is required
to induce first-order stochastic dominance of the equilibrium bid distributions. Second, to obtain the analogous
result on the bidders’ bidding behavior in the more standard high-bid auction, the condition required is that
of reverse hazard rate dominance. The relationship between standard and procurement auctions is analyzed by
Pesendorfer (2000) and de Castro and de Frutos (2010).
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This definition will be helpful in analyzing the buyer’s problem of choosing which project
design to auction off after observing the value of β. Note that in this model where only two
alternative designs are available, the wrong project is the one which has the higher probability
of exhibiting imperfections. If β > 1/2, A is the wrong project. Conversely, if β < 1/2, B is the
wrong project. We can now present our second result:
Proposition 2. If:
(i) the contractor is entitled to make, and can commit to, a take-it-or-leave it offer to the
buyer at the renegotiation stage;
(ii) Assumptions 1 and 2 hold;
(iii) the ratio between the hazard rate of the strong and the weak bidder is lower when the wrong
project is auctioned off;
Then, the buyer finds it profitable to auction off the wrong project.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 2 determines the conditions under which the buyer prefers to auction off the
project specification more likely to be flawed ex-post, that is, the wrong project.
To provide an intuition for the results of this proposition, suppose that β is very high so that
A is the wrong project design. If the buyer decides to auction off project specification B, there
exists a strong asymmetry between the distributions of the two bidders’ pseudo-types. Bidder b,
who is the strong bidder, can win the auction by submitting a very high bid which is detrimental
to the buyer. If the buyer auctions off design A, both the distributions of the weak and the
strong bidders’ pseudo-type are shifted to the left. This is because there is a higher probability
of renegotiating the design, which is beneficial to the bidders since they hold all the bargaining
power at the renegotiation stage. The shift is asymmetric, though, since renegotiation may
fail with a positive probability and the bidders’ willingness to accept a change in the design of
the project depends on which design is initially auctioned off. In particular, when the buyer
auctions off A rather than B, the distribution of a’s pseudo-type becomes closer to that of b and
the identities of the strong and the weak bidders may even change.
From the buyer’s standpoint what matters is that, when the wrong project design is auctioned
off, she receives lower bids and such reduction in the expected payment more than compensates
for the higher expected renegotiation cost. This occurs when the wrong design is initially chosen
because even though the strong bidder is made stronger (his pseudo-type’s distribution is left-
shifted), he faces a rival who is relatively less weak. That is, the weak bidder is strengthened
relatively more than the strong bidder when A rather than B is auctioned off. Therefore, the
strong bidder will submit lower and more aggressive bids.13
The implication is that, if the assumptions of Proposition 2 are satisfied, the buyer is better
off when she auctions off project design A when β > 12 and design B when β <
1
2 . By adopting
13This intuition is triggered by Maskin and Riley (2000a): if a strong bidder faces a bidder who is relatively
less weak than another one, he will react by submitting more aggressive bids.
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the wrong design at the beginning of the game, the buyer is able to stiffen competition at the
bidding stage and receive more aggressive bids from the bidder who is more likely to win the
auction, namely the strong bidder.
Φ(θ)
1
0
1 2 θ
ΦbA(θ) ΦaA(θ)
(a)
Φ(θ)
1
0
1 2 θ
ΦbB(θ) ΦaB(θ)
(b)
Figure 1: Distribution of bidders’ pseudo-types for β = 0.8 and h = 0.5.
A graphical example may help grasp the intuition: in Figure 1 we compare the distributions
of bidders’ pseudo-types when an auction for A (part (a) of the figure) and B (part (b)) take
place under the following assumptions for the distributions and the parameters: c˜l ∼ U [1, 2],
c˜h ∼ U [2, 3], h = 0.5, and β = 0.8. The buyer clearly gains from auctioning off the wrong
specification, A, as the firms are made far less asymmetric in so strengthening the competition
at the bidding stage. Such benefit is not outdone by the higher rent he expects to pay.
4 Second-price Auction and Strategic Choice of the Design
In the first part of the paper we have shown that the buyer may be willing to auction off the
wrong project design to induce more aggressive bidding behavior in a first-price procurement
auction. Another auction format widely popular is that of the English auction and in this section
we investigate whether also in this different context the buyer may have similar incentives
to strategically choose the initial design of the project. The English auction is strategically
equivalent to a second-price auction where the bidder who submits the lowest bid wins the
auction and receives from the buyer an amount equivalent to the second-lowest bid.
In this section we build on Cantillon (2008) who studies how asymmetries between bidders
impact on the expected revenues. Cantillon shows that an auction environment can be fully
characterized by a configuration, namely the cumulative distributions of bidders’ valuations (the
bidders’ pseudo-types in our model). Recall that in a second-price auction the distribution
of the opponents’ pseudo-types does not affect the equilibrium bidding strategy of a player:
bidding one’s own expected cost net of the expected renegotiation gain is a weakly dominant
strategy. Thus, the expected winning bid for the auction of design J equals the expected value
of the second-order statistics of the configuration (ΦaJ ,ΦbJ), for J = A,B. Following Cantillon
(2008), we can denote by SJ the cumulative distribution function of the second-order statistics
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of configuration (ΦaJ ,ΦbJ) as follows (arguments are omitted):
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SJ = ΦaJΦbJ + (1− ΦaJ)ΦbJ + (1− ΦbJ)ΦaJ = ΦaJ + ΦbJ − ΦaJΦbJ (3)
The choice of the initial design to auction off affects the distributions of the pseudo-types the
buyer faces and therefore is analogous to selecting one out of two alternative configurations. For
any value of β the buyer will select the configuration which minimizes the expected procurement
cost, knowing h and the distributions of c˜h and c˜l.
Note that if for all θ it holds that SA ≥ SB when β > 1/2 and strictly so for some values
of θ, then the expected payment to the winning bidder is lower when the wrong design is put
out for tender.15 Since the wrong auction entails a higher expected loss for the buyer associated
with the potential inadequacy of the design, this condition is only necessary for the buyer to be
willing to auction off the wrong design under the English auction format.
To determine whether or not the buyer will auction off the wrong project design, it is useful
to deal with two cases separately as we did in the previous section. When renegotiation is always
successful, the following proposition shows that the neutrality of the project design found for a
first-price auction is preserved in a second-price auction. Even though the auction for the design
more likely to be flawed leads to a lower expected payment to the winning bidder, this benefit
is exactly offset by the rise in the expected renegotiation cost borne by the buyer. Moreover, as
in the first-price auction, the renegotiation rent per se is not an issue for the buyer as its value
is entirely discounted at the bidding stage.
Proposition 3. If
(i) A second-price auction is held to award the contract;
(ii) the contractor is entitled to make, and can commit to, a take-it-or-leave it offer to the
buyer at the renegotiation stage;
(iii) h ≥ ch − cl;
then:
1. Bidders fully compete away h at the bidding stage.
2. The buyer is indifferent between auctioning off design A or B.
Proof. In the Appendix
Suppose now that the renegotiation may fail as h < ch− cl. The following lemma shows that
when the buyer holds an auction for the wrong project, the expected payment to the winning
bidder decreases.
14In a general setting with N bidders whose types are independently distributed with distribution Φi, the
configuration is (Φ1, ...,ΦN ). Letting S be the cumulative distribution function of the second-order statistics of
(Φ1, ...,ΦN ), this amounts to:
S =
N∑
i=1
(1− Φi)∏
j 6=i
Φj
+ N∏
i=1
Φi
15An analogous condition can be derived when β < 1/2.
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Lemma 4. If
(i) A second-price auction is held to award the contract;
(ii) the contractor is entitled to make, and can commit to, a take-it-or-leave it offer to the
buyer at the renegotiation stage;
(iii) h < ch − cl;
Then, the expected payment to the winning bidder is lower for the wrong project design.
Proof. In the Appendix
We now provide some intuitions as to when it is more likely that auctioning off the wrong
project is profitable for the buyer. This occurs when the auction of the wrong design involves a
decrease in the expected payment to the winning bidder that suffices to compensate the buyer
for the higher expected loss due to the inadequacy of the design. To this end, we consider the
distribution of the weak bidder’s pseudo-type. Consider that in a second-price reverse auction
with two bidders the expected payment to the winning bidder is weakly higher than the expected
value (pseudo-type) of the weak bidder.
Suppose that the identities of the weak and strong bidders are affected by the project design
auctioned off. This happens when the probability of renegotiating the initial design is not too
high. When this is the case, the following lemma shows that auctioning off the wrong rather
than the right design shifts to the left the distribution of the weak bidder’s pseudo-type by more
than the increase in the expected renegotiation rent.
Lemma 5. If
(i) A second-price auction is held to award the contract;
(ii) the contractor is entitled to make, and can commit to, a take-it-or-leave it offer to the
buyer at the renegotiation stage;
(iii) h < ch − cl;
(iv) the identities of the weak and strong bidders are determined by the design auctioned off.
The distribution of the weak bidder’s pseudo-type shifts to the left by more than the increase in
the expected renegotiation rent when the wrong rather than the right design is auctioned off.
Proof. In the Appendix
5 Discussion
Discrimination. In the model we have abstracted away from other possible tools the buyer
might use to strengthen competition between bidders. Building on Myerson’s work on optimal
auction design (Myerson, 1981), McAfee and McMillan (1989) show that it is optimal to discrim-
inate against those firms which have on average a lower cost of production. This is desirable
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as it induces a more balanced competition between bidders. Also in our setting, through an
appropriate use of handicaps the buyer could toughen competition at the bidding stage by re-
ducing the ex-ante asymmetry existing between bidders. Therefore, instead of using the project
design more likely to be inadequate ex-post, the buyer could induce the bidders to bid more
aggressively with handicaps.16 Very often the rules which govern how public purchases should
be tendered tend to favor some subset of bidders, e.g. domestic against foreign bidders. How-
ever, these procurement policies are likely due to the pressure of certain interest groups and do
not normally have any solid economic justification. Relative to handicaps, a public agency may
have more freedom in the initial selection of a project design. This may then be used as a tool
to stiffen competition without drawing much criticism and controversy.
Complete contract. One critical assumption that is maintained throughout the paper is
that the buyer is unable to hold a multiple-design auction, that is an auction in which each
bidder specifies a vector of prices, one for any possible design that could be implemented. To
justify our assumption, we have invoked the presence of costs that the buyer must incur to
contractually describe the designs ex-ante which make it impossible to specify both A and B at
time 0. When this is the case, the buyer must choose which project design to auction off. In
this environment we have highlighted how the buyer could select a design more unlikely to be
adequate to stiffen competition at the bidding stage.
In a complete contracting setting there is no room for such a strategic choice. It is possible
to show that the buyer can devise a multiple-design auction which (i) induces the suppliers
to reveal their true costs of production for the alternative designs and (ii) preempts ex-post
renegotiation by automatically implementing a design change whenever it is efficient.17 It is
worth noticing that the buyer does not benefit from being unable to write a complete contract.
6 Conclusion
Renegotiation of procurement contracts is a widespread practice. In a number of cases, renego-
tiation is apparently unrelated to any contract incompleteness explanation, namely, it is not the
emergence of ex-ante unforeseeable contingencies to trigger substantial contract modifications.
In this paper, we have shown that if the prior probability of a failure of a project specification
is known to all the parties to a contract, the buyer may act strategically when choosing the
design of the project to auction off. In particular, the buyer may decide to hold an auction for
the project design which has a lower probability of being appropriate, in an effort to toughen
competition at the bidding stage.
Our model can be best applied to the Design-Bid-Build (DBB) project delivery system
which is the traditional and, to date, the most widely used method to organize and design
16To provide an example of such a discriminatory auction, consider a First Price Handicap Auction with
Handicap ∆ and two bidders. A supplier i who is discriminated against a supplier j wins only if ti ≤ tj + ∆.
There are other forms of discrimination which are closely related, such as bonuses and cost shifts, which can yield
the same equilibrium allocation (see Mares and Swinkels, 2014).
17Namely whenever the welfare loss due to delivering an inadequate design outweighs the higher cost of pro-
duction that the alternative design would entail.
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procurement contracts in the US construction industry.18 Its distinguishing feature is that the
design and the building tasks are carried out by two different entities. First, the buyer engages
architects and engineers to prepare the desired specification of the project which is then put out
for tender to interested general contractors. The insights of our model may prove useful in all
those procurement environments where there are alternative designs available to produce the
same good, but ex-ante there is uncertainty about which specification is the most appropriate.
Consider, for instance, the Souterrain tram tunnel project in The Hague. There, the contractor
won the tender with a very low bid and questioned a part of the design. It was eventually
allowed to finish the project using its own design and technology (see Leijten, 2009).
While the change in the design considered in this paper occurs shortly after the sign of the
contract, in other circumstances the buyer may grow unsatisfied with the design only after a
relevant period of time. For instance, this happens when flaws in the specification of the good
are discovered once production is already underway or it is already completed. Then fixing
the faulty design might be extremely costly and the buyer may strive to minimize the ex-ante
probability of a design failure. This is a topic which requires further investigation.
We have considered a simplified setting in which there are two bidders and two projects.
The results would carry over to an environment in which there are several bidders specialized
in either delivering A or B.
18A recent study by RSMeans Reed Construction Data Market Intelligence for The Design-Build Institute of
America (DBIA) shows that more than 50% of non-residential constructions in the US were procured through
the DBB system in 2010.
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Appendix
Lemma 1
The bidders bid accordingly to a weakly monotonic bidding function. That is, if ti = γi(θiJ),
then γi(θ
′
iJ) ≥ γi(θˆiJ) if θ′iJ > θˆiJ , for i = a, b and J = A,B.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assumption 1 is required to prove this lemma. Its three conditions can be
rewritten as follows.
(a) Bidders’ pseudo-types are drawn independently. Formally:φaJ(θaJ |θbJ) = φaJ(θaJ)φbJ(θbj |θaJ) = φbJ(θbJ)
for J = A,B.
(b) Bidders’ expected profits must decrease monotonically in their own types: ∂Epii(J)∂θiJ < 0 for
i = a, b and J = A,B.
(c) Firms’ expected profits must be weakly supermodular: ∂
2Epii(J)
∂t∂θiJ
≥ 0 for i = a, b and J =
A,B.
In our model, the expected profit function of bidder i who competes with bidder l to be
awarded the contract for project J = A,B takes the following form:
EθlJpii(ti, θiJ) =
∫
Pr(ti≤γl(θlJ ))
(ti − θiJ)φlJ(θlJ)dθlJ
where γl(θlJ) is firm l ’s bid function which solely depends on his own pseudo-type. We can
define Pi(ti) as the conditional probability of i’s winning the procurement auction with a bid
equal to ti. Formally:
Pi(ti) =
∫
Pr(ti≤γl(θlJ ))
φlJ(θlJ)dθlJ
which is a weakly decreasing function of ti, because of assumptions (b) and (c).
Now, suppose that tˆi and t
′
i are the best responses of player i when his type is θˆiJ and θ
′
iJ ,
respectively. If so, for any tˆi and t
′
i it must hold that:
EθlJpii(tˆi, θˆiJ) = (tˆi − θˆiJ)Pi(tˆi) ≥ (t′i − θˆiJ)Pi(t′i) (4)
by definition of best response. Note that the right-hand side of 4 can be written as:
t′iPi(t
′
i)− θ′iJPi(t′i) + θ′iJPi(t′i)− θˆiJPi(t′i) = (t′i − θ′iJ)Pi(t′i) + (θ′iJ − θˆiJ)Pi(t′i)
Therefore, 4 can be rewritten as
EθlJpii(tˆi, θˆiJ) ≥ EθlJpii(t′i, θ′iJ) + (θ′iJ − θˆiJ)Pi(t′i) (5)
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And, if θ′iJ > θˆiJ , we attain that:
Pi(tˆi) ≥ EθlJpii(tˆi, θˆiJ)− EθlJpii(t
′
i, θ
′
iJ)
θ′iJ − θˆiJ
≥ Pi(t′i) (6)
The numerator is always positive due to assumption (b). Furthermore, if we let θ′iJ → θˆiJ we
have that
∂EθlJpii(ti, θiJ)
∂θiJ
= −Pi(ti)
Since the probability that i wins the auction when his pseudo-type rises does not increase and
the fact that the function Pi in weakly decreasing in ti it cannot be that θ
′
iJ > θˆiJ and t
′
i < tˆi.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Condition (i) ensures that a profitable renegotiation is always successful as the informed
party, the contractor, is entitled to make a TIOLI offer to which he can fully commit.
Because of condition (iii), it is always socially optimal to change a flawed design: the max-
imum cost differential is at most as high as h. Stated differently, there are always gains from
renegotiation.
The above has two implications. First, given the design auctioned off, the extent to which
both costs’ distributions are left-shifted by the expected value of the renegotiation rent is the
same. Therefore, at the tender stage the bidders entirely discount the renegotiation rents they
expect to receive if they win the auction, which is βh if the initial design is A and (1 − β)h if
the initial design is B. As a result, the renegotiation rent is not an issue for the buyer.
The second implication is that a bidder’s expected cost of production is unaffected by which
design is auctioned off. Namely, E[ca(A)] = E[ca(B)] and E[cb(A)] = E[cb(B)]. The outcome of
the bidding process is unaffected by the probability of renegotiating the design ex-post. Because
of condition (ii), bidders whose pseudo-type is higher submit weakly higher bids (see Lemma 1).
The buyer is then indifferent between auctioning off either of the two specifications of the project
because the choice of the initial design does not affect the relative strength of the bidders.
Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) The distribution of the equilibrium bids of the weak firm first order
stochastically dominates that of the strong firm, if hazard rate dominance is fulfilled. That is,
if φw(θ)1−Φw(θ) <
φs(θ)
1−Φs(θ)∀θ ∈ [θw; θs], then Pw(t) < Ps(t) ∀t ∈ (t, t).
Define the equilibrium bidding strategy for player i as ti = γi(θi). Since the distribution
of winning bids in equilibrium is continuous (see Lemma 2), it follows that γi(θi) is strictly
increasing at all θi for which γi(θi) ≥ t. As a result the equilibrium inverse bid function, gi(t),
is well defined at all t ≥ t for which there exists θi such that t belongs to the support of γi(θi).
Bidder i chooses his bid so as to maximize his expected profit:
max
t
(t− θi)[1− Φj(gj(t))]
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The first order condition is
1
t− θi = g
′
j(t)
φj(gj(t))
1− Φj(gj(t))
The equilibrium inverse bid functions can be found as a solution to a system of first order
differential equations:  1t−gw(t) = g′s(t)
φs(gs(t))
1−Φs(gs(t))
1
t−gs(t) = g
′
w(t)
φw(gw(t))
1−Φw(gw(t))
(7)
with the following boundary conditions:
(i) Φi(gi(t)) = 0 for i = s, w;
(ii) if θ¯s = θ¯w = θ¯, then t¯ = θ¯;
(iii) if θ¯s < θ¯w, then t¯ = min{arg maxt(t− θ¯s)[1− Φw(gw(t))]}.
The second and third boundary conditions imply that t¯ ∈ [θ¯s, θ¯w]. Note first that it cannot be
that t¯ < θ¯s, or else either the strong pseudo-type with realization θ¯s or the weak pseudo-type
with realization θw ∈ [θ¯s, θ¯w] would be incurring a loss when winning the contract. Second, it
cannot be that t¯ > θ¯w: since the distribution of the winning bids is continuous, θ¯s could slightly
undercut his bid increasing his probability of winning in such a way that the overall effect on
his expected profit is positive. Thus, when the upper bound of the distributions of the weak’s
and strong’s pseudo-types is the same and equal to θ¯, then t¯ = θ¯. Conversely, if θ¯s < θ¯w, t¯ < θ¯w
which increases θ¯s’s probability of winning discontinuously and is given by the minimum bid
which satisfies his maximization problem.
Now, let Pi(t) = Φi(gi(t)), i.e. Pi(t) is the equilibrium bid distribution of bidder i. Let
Hi(Pi) = Φ
−1
i (Pi(t)) = gi(t). The system of equations 7 becomes: 1t−Hw(Pw(t)) =
P ′s(t)
1−Ps(t))
1
t−Hs(Ps(t)) =
P ′w(t)
1−Pw(t))
(8)
Suppose there exists t′ ∈ [t, t¯] such that Ps(t′) = Pw(t′). Since hazard rate dominance implies
first order stochastic dominance, Φw(θ) < Φs(θ) and as a result Hs(P ) < Hw(P ), ∀P ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, from 8 we obtain19:
P ′w(t′)
1− Pw(t′) =
1
t′ −Hs(Ps(t′)) <
1
t′ −Hw(Pw(t′)) =
P ′s(t′)
1− Ps(t′) (9)
From the above it follows that the ratio PwPs is decreasing at t
′. The same would occur for any t
for which Pw(t)Ps(t) = 1. But this implies that the distributions of the equilibrium bids cannot cross
more than once. Since they cross at t = t¯, it follows that Pw(t) < Ps(t) for all t ∈ (t, t¯).
(ii) If Assumption 1 and 2 hold, the weak bidder will bid more aggressively than the strong
bidder for any bid in the interior of their common support, that is ∀t ∈ (t, t) it holds that
gw(t) > gs(t).
19Note that the first part of Lemma 3 just requires first order stochastic dominance.
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Consider that if θs < θw, then at t = t, gw(t) > gs(t). Instead if θs = θw, then gw(t) = gs(t),
and because of HRD, it must be that g′w(t) > g′s(t) in a neighborhood of t = t:
1
t− gs(t) = g
′
w(t)
φw(gw(t))
1− Φw(gw(t)) = g
′
s(t)
φs(gs(t))
1− Φs(gs(t)) =
1
t− gw(t)
But if so, for t ∈ (t, t), it cannot be that gs(t) > gw(t), otherwise:
1
t− gs(t) = g
′
w(t)
φw(gw(t))
1− Φw(gw(t)) > g
′
s(t)
φs(gs(t))
1− Φs(gs(t)) =
1
t− gw(t)
Because of HRD, that condition would imply:
P ′w(t)
1− Pw(t) >
P ′s(t)
1− Ps(t) ,
which contradicts our previous finding. Therefore, gw(t) > gs(t), namely, the weak bidder bids
consistently more aggressively than the strong bidder, or, to put it differently, the degree of bid
shading of the weak bidder is lower than that of the strong bidder:
1
t− gs(t) = g
′
w(t)
φw(gw(t))
1− Φw(gw(t)) < g
′
s(t)
φs(gs(t))
1− Φs(gs(t)) =
1
t− gw(t)∀t ∈ (t, t) (10)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that β > 12 so that the wrong project is A. Let us first show that, by choosing
the wrong design, the distributions of both the weak and the strong bidders’ pseudo-types are
shifted to the left with respect to the case in which the right design is adopted (only weakly
for the strong bidder). In particular, ΦwA > ΦwB for all θ ∈ (θwA, θ¯wB) and ΦsA ≥ ΦsB for all
θ ∈ (θsA, θ¯sB).
For the weak stochastic dominance of the strong bidder under B consider the following:
 b is always the strong bidder when design B is auctioned off since he has a strictly lower
probability of having a high cost of production than a.
 For design A, the strong bidder can be either b or a. Suppose that a is the strong bidder. If
so, for both the wrong (A) and the right (B) project, the strong bidder is the one specialized
in the initial design. This means that the initial cost of production is low and renegotiation
succeeds only if h is large enough so that it more than offsets the higher cost of production
that the alternative design entails. Note that the probability that renegotiation takes place
is higher under A than B (β rather than 1− β). Hence ΦaA ≥ ΦbB, with strict inequality
for h sufficiently high. If h is small, renegotiation never succeeds and the two distributions
coincide.
 Suppose conversely that b is the strong bidder for both designs A and B. This implies
that ΦbA > ΦaA and, since ΦaA ≥ ΦbB, ΦbA > ΦbB.
For the strict stochastic dominance of the weak bidder under B consider the following:
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 Since the strong bidder when B is auctioned off is b, the weak bidder for B is always a.
 When design A is auctioned off, the weak bidder can be either b or a. Suppose that b is
the weak bidder. Note that b’s pseudo-type distribution under A is left-shifted more than
that of a under B as the former has a higher probability of enjoying a low cost and getting
the renegotiation rent (β rather than 1− β). Hence, ΦbA > ΦaB.
 Suppose conversely that a is the weak bidder also when design A is auctioned off. Since
ΦaA ≥ ΦbB and ΦbB > ΦaB, it must be that ΦaA > ΦaB.
Therefore, holding an auction for the wrong project weakly strengthens the strong bidder and
strictly strengthens the weak bidder20.
Auctioning off the wrong project induces the strong bidder to submit consistently more
aggressive bids only if the weak bidder’s pseudo-type distribution is reinforced more than the
strong bidder’s pseudo-type distribution:
ΦsB
ΦwB
>
ΦsA
ΦwA
> 1, ∀θ ∈ (θsA, θwB) (11)
The above ratio measures the relative strength of two bidders and has been introduced by
Kirkegaard (2009) who shows that first-order stochastic dominance (the ratio being above 1) is
necessary for the more aggressive bidding behavior of the weak bidder. A stronger condition
is required for the result of Proposition 2 to hold, which concerns the ratio of the hazard rate
functions:
φsA
1−ΦsA
φwA
1−ΦwA
<
φsB
1−ΦsB
φwB
1−ΦwB
, ∀θ ∈ (θsA, θwB) (12)
When the above holds, bidders are made less asymmetric when an auction for the wrong project
is held. As shown by Maskin and Riley (2000a) (Proposition 3.5), when a strong bidder faces
a relatively less weak bidder, he reacts by bidding consistently more aggressively. Therefore, if
(12) is fulfilled, the strong bidder faces a relatively less weak bidder in the auction for A than
for B and he will bid consistently more aggressively in the wrong auction. This implies:
1
t− gsA(t) >
1
t− gsB(t) (13)
∀ t ∈ (tA, t¯A), which is the interior of the support of the distribution of the equilibrium bids
when the project design auctioned off is A. From above gsA(t) > gsB(t). By holding an auction
for the wrong project the buyer manages to stiffen competition as she makes the strong bidder
bid consistently more aggressively and the strong bidder is the bidder more likely to win the
auction, as shown in Lemma 3: Ps(t) = Φs(gs(t)) > Φw(gw(t)) = Pw(t).
20In investigating firms’ incentives to invest in cost reduction in a procurement auction, Arozamena and Can-
tillon (2004) model the investment as a reduction of the ex-ante distribution of costs (a distributional upgrade)
which is similar to the effects that the auction of a wrong project design brings about in our paper.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Assume that h ≥ c¯h − cl so that renegotiation is always successful. In a second-price
auction it is a dominant strategy to bid one’s own expected cost net of the expected renegotiation
rent.
Thus, if the buyer auctions off design A, tiA = E[ci(A)] − βh for i = a, b. The buyer’s
expected utility is then21:
EU(A) = v−max{taA, tbA}−βh = v−max{E[ca(A)], E[cb(A)]}+βh−βh = v−max{E[ca(A)], E[cb(A)]}.
If the buyer auctions off design B, tiB = E[ci(B)]− (1− β)h for i = a, b. The buyer’s expected
utility is then:
EU(B) = v −max{taB, tbB} − (1− β)h = v −max{E[ca(B)], E[cb(B)]}+ (1− β)h− (1− β)h
= v −max{E[ca(B)], E[cb(B)]}.
The renegotiation rent is not a concern for the buyer since it is fully competed away at the
bidding stage. Moreover, the buyer is indifferent between auctioning off design A or B as
E[ca(A)] = E[ca(B)] and E[cb(A)] = E[cb(B)]. That is, when renegotiation is always successful
EU(A) = EU(B).
Note that when A is auctioned off, the distributions of the pseudo-types are left-shifted with
respect to the case in which design B is auctioned off. The magnitude of the relative shift to the
left is the same for both bidders and equals (2β− 1)h. Hence, the expected winning bid is lower
under the wrong auction by the amount (2β − 1)h. However, this exactly offsets the increase in
the cost of renegotiating the project that the buyer expects to incur when she selects design A
rather than B.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Assume that a renegotiation does not always succeed. Given a configuration (ΦaJ ,ΦbJ),
in a second-price auction the distribution of the buyer’s payment coincides with the cumulative
distribution function of the second-order statistics of configuration (ΦaJ ,ΦbJ).
Suppose that β > 1/2 so that the right design is B and compare SA and SB (arguments are
dropped):
SA = ΦaA + ΦbA − ΦaAΦbA
SB = ΦaB + ΦbB − ΦaBΦbB
In the proof of Proposition 2 it is shown that ΦaA ≥ ΦbB and ΦbA > ΦaB. Suppose first that
ΦaA = ΦbB and consider the difference between SA and SB:
SA − SB = ΦaA + ΦbA − ΦaAΦbA − (ΦaB + ΦbB − ΦaBΦbB)
This is equivalent to:
(ΦbA − ΦaB)(1− ΦbB) ≥ 0
21While the lowest bidder is awarded the contract, the price he receives equals the second-lowest bid.
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with strict inequality for some θ. Suppose instead that ΦaA > ΦbB and in particular ΦaA =
ΦbB + η, where also η is a function of θ. Then:
SA − SB = (ΦbA − ΦaB)(1− ΦbB) + η(1− ΦbA) ≥ 0
where the strict inequality holds for some θ. Hence, the expected payment to the winning bidder
is lower when the wrong project is auctioned off.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose that β > 1/2 so that the wrong project design is A. Suppose further that
renegotiation does not always succeed and the identities of the weak and the strong bidders are
affected by which design is initially chosen by the buyer. This means that, as seen in the proof
of Proposition 2, the weak (respectively, strong) bidder is b (a) when the initial design is A and
is a (b) when the initial design is B. This is more likely to occur when β is not too high.
Note that in this case the weak bidder is always willing to accept a change in the design.
Comparing the distributions of the weak bidder’s pseudo-type when the design auctioned off is A
and B, it is possible to note that the former is shifted to the left with respect to the latter by two
different components. The first component pertains to the increase in the expected renegotiation
gain which is equal to (2β − 1)h. The second component pertains to the reduced expected cost
of production: under the wrong auction the weak bidder has a higher probability of incurring a
low production cost. In expectation this second component amounts to (2β−1)(Ec˜h−Ec˜l) > 0.
Thus, distribution of the weak bidder’s pseudo-type is shifted to the left by more than the higher
renegotiation cost that the buyer incurs by selecting the wrong design - which is just (2β − 1)h.
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